Proof Texting Fallacy

A recurring practice in the American political landscape

On my mind, 05192025: For some reason a keynote speech/rant given by J.D. Vance at the November 2, 2021 National Conservative Conference in Orlando, Fl in which Vance quotes Richard Nixon is making the rounds these days in the national conversation about the slow rolling and internal coup d’état happening in plain sight. In the speech, Vance says, “There is a wisdom in what Richard Nixon said approximately 40 to 50 years ago, he said, and I quote, ‘the professors are the enemy.’” (Wow, what with Google and all, I am surprised he could so specifically narrow down in time the passage he is quoting). By and large, Vance’s speech is an attack on what he calls “hostile institutions” that are impeding the conservative movement, targeting specifically the universities of this country. The Nixon quote is at the end of Vance’s speech. Vance’s concluding message to the National Conservative Conference was, “The professors are the enemy.”

Not wanting to be unnecessarily argumentative with His Royal Highness, Prince J.D., I suggest the devil is in the details. Let me begin with specifics—The Nixon quote comes at the end of a conversation about Vietnam between Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Alexander Haig on December 14, 1972, between 10:08 and 11:46 a.m. in the Oval Office (sorry, “40 to 50 years ago” was too ambiguous for me).

While peace talks in Paris had sputtered since May 10, 1968, neither side truly committed to serious negotiations. Nixon, ready to force peace in Vietnam on his terms, bombed North Vietnam (Operation Linebacker) from May 9 to October 23, 1972. This was the first continuous bombing operation by the US over North Vietnam since Operation Rolling Thunder, which ended in November 1968. The 1972 Operation Linebacker decimated the North Vietnamese air defenses and forced them to send their delegation back to Paris to resume the peace talks. The North Vietnamese delegation arrived on November 20, 1972. On a wintry day, December 14, 1972, Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig discussed the progress of those peace talks.

The transcript of the conversation between Nixon and Kissinger shows that the first three days of the talks were very productive. By November 23rd, Kissinger thought they were very close to an agreement. But at the end of that third day, the leader of the North Vietnamese delegation received a message and asked for a recess. According to Kissinger, everything changed after that. The North Vietnamese became more and more intransigent and added demands that favored them over South Vietnam. Kissinger believed the living spaces of the South Vietnamese delegation were bugged because the new North Vietnamese demands were too specific and responsive to private conversations away from the conference room. Kissinger reported to Nixon that the talks were going nowhere; they were being played. Something must happen.

They begin to talk about alternative actions. At one point, Nixon says, “What I meant is, at the time—what I’m talking about is are we going to have enough time? All these assholes in the press said we were wrong. Now, at the present time, the press will say, “We’re quite aware we’re very, very close to peace, and d-d-d-d-d.” They were wrong, and so when it turns the other way, they’re going to say, “Peace has escaped d-d-d-d-d,” and they’re going to be wrong again. And it isn’t going to make a goddamn bit of difference. My point is, you’ve got to remember who the enemy are. The enemy has never changed. The election didn’t change it. The only friends we’ve got, Henry, are a few people of rather moderate education out in this country, and thank God, they’re about 61 percent of the people, who support us. The left-wingers, most of your friends, and most—and many of mine—are against us.”

At this point, Kissinger says, “Well, they’re so tawdry, right (the press)? Now, let’s come down to where we’ve got to go.” Nixon responds, “Looking back, we probably should have let it wait ’til the election, and the day after the election: Whack! You know?... That’s probably what we should have done, but we didn’t.” Kissinger reluctantly states, “That Christmas truce proposal of Thieu is a disaster, because it removes the few military pressures that we have got left. Therefore, I have come to the reluctant conclusion that we’ve got to put it to them in Hanoi, painful as it is.”

The extended discussion continues with details of what will happen. It is clear that Nixon feels very little empathy for the South Vietnamese at this point and does not trust the North Vietnamese at all. Additionally, he is exasperated with the US Military leadership. Another bombing campaign over Hanoi must happen. The release of American POWs is the only thing that will stop this. South Vietnam will be propped up as best as possible (do I hear whispers of Trump’s February 2020 Doha agreement with the Taliban?).

Their conversation now moves to how to “handle” the press. Kissinger comments, “We’ve always snowed the press by just overwhelming them with technical”(Nixon interrupts). He wants to bomb Hanoi into submission and make the resumed bombing appear necessary because of Hanoi’s intransigence. Nixon says, “What I’d like for you to do, if you would, would be to sit down, later this afternoon or this evening—you’ve got plenty of time to think—put down on one sheet of paper, put five or six positive points you want the press to write, to come out of this. This is what we have to do. And then, let everything play around that, rather than giving the press what they would like. And that is simply a gory and brilliant analysis of what they did to us, and what we did to them, and we had it here and there, they had it there and there, and this and that. That will ruin us. That will really ruin us. If, on the other hand, we can—the public gets the impression that this broke because these bastards were at fault, that they want to impose a Communist government, they’re still holding our prisoners, and we want to get them back, and, consequently, the President is going to insist on taking the strong action to get this war over with. This war must end! It must end soon! And if they don’t want to talk, we will have to go get ’em. If they won’t return our prisoners, we want to hit them soon. We’re going to take the necessary military action to get them back. That’s what you’ve got to get across.” But Nixon is clear, “But if you, at the present time, you can start bombing, say: ‘Because of significant enemy buildup activities north of that’—put it on military grounds, not on political grounds. Don’t say that we started bombing because they broke off negotiations. Don’t say that. Now, that’s just the wrong decision.”

As they discussed the strategy of the bombing, Nixon became very agitated against the military leadership and how the generals managed the war. He wants a unified command, and he wants a “win.” As the conversation continues developing, Nixon says, “The main thing to get across when the bombing goes, starts again, Al—remember this is something [unclear] and Ziegler will be talking about—the main point is that I really want this time, Henry, as I said, I don’t want a long talking sheet. I just want to see one page, like I do before I do a very important press thing. What are the points we want to pound into the consciousness of these dumb, left-wing enemies of ours in the press? Pound ’em out. Pound ’em out, and forget about it. Make all the other points, because that dazzles them. But remember, we’ve got an audience out there that’s ours. Talk to the 61 percent. Talk to—I know, everybody thinks they’re dummies—they were smart enough to vote for us.”

They decide to resume a named bombing operation over Vietnam. Operation Linebacker II begins on December 18 and continues until December 29 (with a US truce on Christmas Day). North Vietnam returned to the peace talks on December 30, and the final Paris Peace Accord, “ending” the conflict, was signed on January 27, 1973. Ending the war was Nixon’s objective. This transcript revealed many of the challenges he faced in the effort from the North Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese, and the US Military. He wanted the peace not to appear to be a surrender, and he wanted to ensure the POWs returned home. Sadly, the Accord did not last. Fighting resumed by March 1973, and Saigon fell disastrously on April 30, 1975.

Below are Nixon’s concluding comments in this transcript about his struggle with the press et al, a battle he fought nearly his whole political career:

“Just say: ‘Except for Christmas Day, there will be no truce.’ I don’t want anybody flying over Christmas Day. People would not understand that. There’s always been a truce; World War I, World War II, and so forth. All right, the main thing is for you to get rested and get ready for all this and go out there and just remember that when it’s toughest, that’s when we’re the best. And remember, we’re going to be around and outlive our enemies. And also, never forget, the press is the enemy. The press is the enemy. The press is the enemy. The establishment is the enemy. The professors are the enemy. Professors are the enemy. Write that on the blackboard 100 times and never forget it. It’s the enemy. So, we use them, at times. But remember, with the exception, now and then, of a—I think Wilson, maybe—there are two or three—Howard Smith. Yes, there are still a few patriots, but most of them are—they’re very disappointed because we beat ’em in the election. They know they’re out of touch with the country. It kills those bastards. They are the enemy, and we’re just gonna continue to use them, and never let them think that we think they’re the enemy. You see my point? But the press is the enemy. The press is the enemy. That’s all.”

While Prince J.D. is free to proof-text this passage as he wishes, context matters. While there is much in this whole conversation (https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d175) that resonates with the present day, Vance’s generalized attack on the higher educational system of our country is not convincingly supported by this uncontextual use of Nixon’s invective against the press, establishment, and “Professors.” Oddly, I don’t remember America or the media being against Nixon’s efforts to end the war. Actually, I recall rather broad support for Nixon ending the war. Moreover, according to Richard Harris in a September 24, 1973 article in the New Yorker (https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1973/10/01/the-presidency-and-the-press ) “In 1960, Nixon was endorsed over Kennedy by seventy-eight per cent of the country’s newspapers that took a position on the election; in 1968, Nixon got eighty per cent of whatever editorial support was expressed; and in 1972 he got ninety-three per cent.” It is clear that for much of his presidency, Nixon had the support of most of the media (maybe not some of the big media, but on the whole, well supported). What might cause Nixon to be so angry with the press in December of 1972? Maybe a little matter that began a few months before this recorded conversation, known as Watergate, on June 27, 1972. At the time of this Nixon-Kissinger conversation, Watergate was not fully known publicly. Still, a few news reporters were beginning to realize the Watergate trail was heading toward the Whitehouse. Nixon must have felt the noose tightening and hoped a dramatic change in Vietnam might beat the press. I do remember how Nixon did not like being questioned or required to follow the rules—something essential to an open and free society. If memory serves me, that did not work well for him. As Prince J.D. et al hurl similar invectives today, it is perhaps not saying what they believe but what they believe is necessary to incite their base and stop any opposition to their insurrection. Alas, we now live in a Machiavellian world where the ends justify the means, goodness concedes to evil as a utilitarian necessity, deceit is justified by deceit, and the masses must be cajoled into submission by manipulation, distraction, and deception. Truly, J.D., you are the Prince.

Note: No grammatical corrections have been made to the portions of the conversation record pasted in the essay.